The main objective of this paper is to explore the adjustment of bank business activities to new regulatory capital requests using panel data analyses of the European banking system. The research hypothesis assumes that the increase in capital requirements affects the banks' balance sheet adjustment and bank lending to the non-financial sector. The banks can maintain the higher regulatory capital ratio by increasing the volume of share capital or by decreasing the risk-weighted assets and bank lending activities. The high equity premium upon a new equity issue due to asymmetric information about the bank's net worth discourages the current shareholder to issue additional capital, which has resulted in bank lending constraints and has increased non-risk bank assets. Banks' response to new capital requirements can announce a long-term negative impact to real Ivica Klinac
Introduction
Under the Basel III regulatory framework (BIS, 2010) requirements is that the higher equity ratio promotes banks' financial stability by reducing the probability of distress of a banking firm and by reducing bank incentives in taking a risk position and increasing the buffer against bank loses.
The most important consequence of additional capital requirements should be the downsizing of banking risks and an increase of banking system stability during the financial crisis periods. Some authors have researched the relations between higher capital requirements and bank risk assets. The empirical results have shown that higher capital increases bank stability and reduces the risk profile of banking assets (Baker & Wurgler, 2014 ). Klomp and de Haan find that capital regulation reduces asset risk based on the bank data from OECD (Klomp & de Haan, 2012) and emerging and developing countries (Klomp & de Haan, 2015) .
Other empirical results from different banking systems have shown that better capitalized banks are more resistant to lending supply in the period of financial Ivica Klinac and Roberto Ercegovac Banking System Adjustment to Regulatory Capital Requirements Croatian Economic Survey : Vol. 20 : No. 2 : December 2018 : pp. 69-96 market shocks, which improves the banking and economic stability (Kapan & Minoiu, 2013) . Beltratti and Stulz (2012) show that higher bank capital reduces the fragility of banking firms and increases the bank's ability to absorb the effects of financial crisis. During the last financial crisis and the significant increase in capital requirements, the banking firms met a new capital requirement with the reduction of risk-weighted asset (mostly in downsizing of lending activities) or the rise of the regulatory capital volume (some banks with regulatory capital ratio near or lower the minimum threshold) 1 . Some authors have found that an additional rise in capital requirements reduces total lending from 3.5 percent (Bridges et al., 2014) up to 7.2 percent (Aiyar, Colomiris, & Wieladek, 2014) . Mésonnier and Monks (2015) analyzed the systematically important banks' effect of enforcement on increasing core capital in a 1.2 percent reduction of credit growth. The empirical evidence has shown that most banks have not funded the additional capital requirements by raising the equity. External equity financing is always costly because of the significant asymmetric information about the bank net value (Asal, 2015) . Acharya and Steffen (2014) have concluded that most banks manipulated with risk models to underestimate risk and minimize capital requirements. Potential investors may consider equity originating in terms of overvalued current shares in case where a problem of adverse selection exists. Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein (2011) have found that raising capital requirements produces a positive impact on marginal costs of banking firms' equity. Recent financial crisis has confirmed negative investors' sentiment to banking shares.
The share prices of the banking firms have not prevailed in the pre-crisis period and shareholders are unmotivated for a new issue due to the capital splitting risk. This is the reason why-by increasing equity-banks orient themselves toward the accumulation of retained earnings (Cohen, 2013) . The main purpose of this paper is to model the behavior of banking firms during the announcement and implementation of new capital requirements in the period of ongoing financial and banking crisis. As far as banking stability and activities are concerned, 1 Banks with a high ratio of non-performing loans and with low regulatory capital ratio increased equity mostly by capitalization of present owners or the debt-to-equity swap (e.g. Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena increased its capital by EUR 3.8 billion, while UniCredit increased its capital by EUR 13 billion in Italy's biggest public offering).
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Banking System Adjustment to Regulatory Capital Requirements Croatian Economic Survey : Vol. 20 : No. 2 : December 2018 : pp. 69-96 prudential regulators are faced with a risk of downsized lending to customers, securities volume, and interbank assets.
Empirical Research
The basis of the empirical research is the analysis of the banking firm adoption to the new regulatory capital requirements. With respect to complying with the new capital structure and regulatory capital ratio requirements, the main research hypotheses have been developed:
• Banking firms will decrease risk-weighted assets by mostly reducing the lending activities.
• Banking firms in the period of the financial crisis are not ready to increase the equity because of the significant capital costs and negative investment sentiment to the banking shares.
The analysis will be done on the representative sample of the European Union's systematically important banks.
Data Selection
The survey was conducted on a sample of 35 banking groups operating in the 
Variable Description
The dependent variable of this survey is the growth of Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA). Independent variables are directly or indirectly related to the ability of a banking firm to meet regulatory capital requirements; and the selected ones are:
• NPL/TL -The ratio of non-performing loans (potentially risky loans for which the value adjustment was made) and total loans expressed in percentage.
• D -Increase of all received deposits of individual banking groups expressed in percentage. • UNPLEU -The unemployment rate in the EU-28 countries, expressed in percentage.
• GDP -The GDP growth of the EU-28 countries, expressed in percentage.
In addition to the abovementioned bank and macroeconomic environment variables, and for the purpose of empirical analysis of the subject research, it has been necessary to define the period of announcement and enforcement of The description of all variables and the expected impact of independent variables are given in Table 1 . The general characteristics of the variables of the observed sample were determined by descriptive statistics as shown in Table 2 . The data processing of the survey data was done by the STATA 14.2 statistical package. The dynamic analysis of the dependent variables of our research was made as the calculation of the average value for all the banking groups at the level of each observed year (Table 3) . Although the number of observations is not the same at the level of the whole sample, which could somehow reduce the credibility of the approximation through the calculation of the average annual value, in this way, we still have enough data to obtain a simpler insight into the dynamics of the observed portfolio of banks as well as the movement of the credit assets in a unit of time. In addition to the basic analysis of the dynamics of the dependent variables, it was necessary to evaluate whether there are differences in the arithmetic means of the banking group variables before and after the announcement of regulatory changes as well as before and after the enforcement of the regulatory measures, using a two-way t-test. Notes: * denotes significance at 10 percent; ** denotes significance at 5 percent; *** denotes significance at 1 percent.
Source: Authors' calculation.
The dependent variable of the observed bank sample shows the statistical significance of differences in arithmetic means before and after the announcement of regulatory measures as well as before and after the enforcement of regulatory Following the announcement of new, more stringent capital requirements implementation, there is a significant average increase of non-performing loans in total loans (NPL / TL) of 27.6 percent, although with a lack of statistical significance. By the enforcement of the new regulatory environment, the expected increase in the share of non-performing loans in total loans (NPL / TL) continued, but also with the absence of statistical significance. Finally, it is logical to expect a more stringent regulatory regime of creditworthiness and reduced lending to small-and medium-sized companies with larger risk weights by the banking firms as well as further regulatory compliance with the relative reduction in the share of assets with credit risk.
The independent variable of average net income from fees and provisions (FR) recorded an average decline after the announcement of the regulatory measure, from 32.9 percent to 30.3 percent, and a slightly higher than average increase of +1.7 percent after the enforcement of the measure.
Before the formation of the final model, it was necessary to check the correlation between the selected variables. According to the present knowledge, a multicollinearity test in panel models does not exists, while coefficients between pairs of potential independent variables are used in empirical issues related to multicollinearity testing. Based on the correlation matrix results in Table 5 , it can be concluded that there are no pairs of variables which could cause multicollinearity with the simultaneous inclusion in the model if we consider that there is no coefficient that exceeded the value of 0.5. The results from Table 6 suggest a significant correlation between the dummy variables, which is expected and will not be separately considered. In the same way, the expected multicollinearity problem can be seen by the simultaneous inclusion of the unemployment variable and gross domestic product in the empirical models. Although the relationship between these two macro variables is logical and expected, the model estimates will be made by substituting them alternately. 2018 : pp. 69-96 After the descriptive statistics-the t-test of the differences in the arithmetic mean of the selected empirical research variables and the correlation matrix resultsit is necessary to define the model of influence of the prudential regulation of capital requirements on bank credit assets.
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Research Model
Although the econometric analysis is improving and becoming more accurate, empirical research has shown that the data being analyzed have simultaneous temporal and spatial components. Such data containing the temporal and spatial components of some variables are called panel data.
According to Verbeek (2004) , the main advantage of panel data, compared to time series or cross-sectional assemblies, is that they allow the identification of certain parameters or questions without the need to limit the assumptions.
Many economic models suggest that current behavior depends on past behavior For the purposes of this study, panel analysis was performed using a static and dynamic panel, as well as using a dynamic panel with a GMM estimator.
For each static and dynamic panel, fixed effects -Fe and random effects -Re analyses were also performed, while a dynamic panel with a GMM estimator was performed with one or two steps (the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation GMM-type; one-step/two-step 
where i is the unit, t is time, µ is a constant member, γ a parameter of a dependent variable with a lag, β 1 , β 2 ,..., β K are parameters of exogenous variables, x i,t are independent variables, α i is a specific error for a i-th bank, and ε i i represents the error of relation of the i-th bank.
The number of observation units (bank groups) exceeds the number of observation periods that meet the requirement for the Arellano-Bond estimator. Due to the presence of the standard error bias for the GMM estimator in two steps, additional panel model analysis made the choice of a dynamic panel with a GMM estimator in one step. The analysis also found that the number of instruments does not exceed the number of cross-sections, so the properties of the GMM estimator system are not compromised. To keep the number of instruments under control, a one-step dependent variable is used as an instrument.
Finally, Arellano-Bond's one-step estimator with the use of robust standard error will be used for testing the research hypothesis. Due to the use of a number of variables in the proposed model, the same variables could not be included in the model at the same time. In the function of verifying the hypothesis, the basic model had to be expanded by introducing the dummy variable of the announcement and enforcement of regulatory measures. By using the robust standard error in a model for which the Sargan test cannot be used, the validity of the models is estimated on the basis of the autocorrelation test of the first differences of the second-order residuals.
Results and Discussion
In order to test the hypothesis of our research, the basic model can be written via equation 2 (MODEL1) and equation 3 (MODEL2) by using different control variables: The positive sign of the coefficient of deposit growth variables indicates a relative increase in the share of deposits in the total sources of funding for the increase of banks' credit assets. Better quality of deposit coverage, i.e. lowering the risk weighting of the credit assets, makes it easier to meet regulatory requirements as a whole.
The control variable of the macroeconomic environment of GDP growth shows statistical significance and the expected sign, i.e. the increase in GDP is, among other things, the result of the increase in the banking industry credit assets.
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The introduction of the unemployment rate as the control variable in the basic MODEL2 did not show any statistical significance when compared to GDP.
In the next step, the basic model has been extended by introducing the variable of regulatory announcement (DLA), as well as by introducing a variable of regulatory measure enforcement (DLE). In accordance with the pre-defined models, testing will also be done according to defined changes in control variables of banks' macro-business operations.
An extended model can be written using the equation (MODEL3):
i.e. by using the unemployment rate control variable in the equation (MODEL4):
Coefficients of banks' business indicators presented as the non-performing loans growth rates, as well as an increase in net income for fees and provisions are of the same negative sign and are statistically significant as in previous models, while the growth of the deposit is of the counter sign and contributes to the reduction of the risk of credit assets. Furthermore, the value of β 4 coefficient of the DLA variable, upon which the test is performed in both observed models, is positive and statistically significant, i.e. it is evident from both models that 2018 : pp. 69-96 the introduction of the regulatory variable of announcement positively affects the risk-weighted assets. Namely, the results of MODEL3 and MODEL4 show that already with the announcement of the regulatory measures, the banking group started to adapt to new capital requirements. By reducing the risk of credit assets-particularly due to a lack of financing of the small-and medium-sized companies (SMEs) and more risky projects-the banking firm has the influence on compliance with regulatory requirements without changing the equity or the ownership structure. However, the lack of significance of the domestic product growth rate in relation to the credit assets growth suggests that there is no serious credit activity of the banking industry in the function of boosting the credit cycle and domestic product growth following the announcement of regulatory measures. The control macro variable of the unemployment rate is also not statistically significant.
The introduction of regulatory enforcement variable into models (DLE) has been statistically significant and can be expressed by the equation (MODEL5):
i.e. by using the unemployment rate control variable in the equation (MODEL6): Based on the results of the estimated models, the direction and the statistical significance of the observed variables, it can be concluded that regulatory Ivica Klinac and Roberto Ercegovac Banking System Adjustment to Regulatory Capital Requirements Croatian Economic Survey : Vol. 20 : No. 2 : December 2018 : pp. 69-96 measures of increasing capital requirements have negative effects on banks' credit activities.
Concluding Remarks
The intensity of financial crisis and its impact on financial system functionality caused by prudential regulations has been more forceful than ever in history. Source: Reuters. 
DLA/DLE
Notes: Avrg_TA -total average assets; Avrg_TRFA -total average risk-free assets; Avrg_TRWA -total average risk/ credit assets; Avrg_ROE -total average return on equity; DLA/DLE -time period of announcement / enforcement of regulatory requirements.
Sources: Reuters and authors' calculation.
